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THE UTILITY OF PREDICTING
DANGEROUSNESS IN THE WAR ON TERROR
CATHERINE R. L. LAWSON*
INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, questions
surrounding the use of power in many contexts confronted the United
States in the new context of a War on Terror. These fresh inquiries centered
primarily on the definitions and distinctions between “war” and armed
conflict, the treatment of prisoners captured in the course of hostilities
abroad, and the murky outer limits of executive authority in this new
historical context. Nowhere did these pressing questions emerge more
explicitly than in the cases brought by detainees held in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba.
The line of habeas corpus cases emerging from Guantanamo has
trended towards a gradual expansion of the habeas doctrine, a doctrine still
not fully developed in its application to non-state actors suspected or
convicted of terrorism. From Rasul to Boumediene, the Supreme Court has
progressively clarified that the writ of habeas does indeed apply to certain
foreign individuals in some international contexts.1 However, as the
preceding qualifying language suggests, the way in which the writ
manifests on behalf of those individuals remains a murkier question. Since
Boumediene, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has
been the principal court to address this question, as the circuit charged with
maintaining jurisdiction over the Guantanamo habeas appeals.
In its attempts to formulate an appropriate habeas process that both
respects the government’s interests in both security and secrecy while also
* Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected May 2012; American University, B.A. 2008. I
would like to thank Professors Sam Buell and Joseph Blocher for creating a wonderful class in which to
begin thinking like a legal scholar. I would also like to thank Joshua L.L. Lawson for listening to and
working through the many ideas that led to this note, and for his unflagging encouragement. Finally,
thank you to the wonderful staff members of the Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law for
their support and assistance. All errors are my own.
1. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004)
(“Whatever traction the presumption against extraterritoriality might have in other contexts, it certainly
has no application to the operation of the habeas statute with respect to persons detained within the
‘territorial jurisdiction’ of the United States.”) (citing Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285
(1949)).
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guarding the rights of detained individuals against excessive executive
force, the D.C. Circuit has explored numerous procedural and substantive
issues in the new light of international terrorism. Paradigmatically, the
overarching struggle has remained whether and to what extent traditional
notions of domestic criminal law and the international law of war should
apply in the terrorism context. Scholars and political analysts have eagerly
added their own opinions on the matter, opinions that run the spectrum
from advocating for exclusively domestic criminal prosecutions2 to a
wholesale adoption of the law of war framework,3 with others
recommending the establishment of a new judicial branch to handle this
class of cases.4
In this Note, I will draw on this broad debate to consider a narrower
inquiry left underutilized in some D.C. Circuit opinions: future
dangerousness. In its most basic form, the future dangerousness inquiry
requires executive agents to make an evidentiary showing of individualspecific harmful conduct, or risk of harmful conduct, to the community
such that a tribunal deems continued detention necessary to ensure the
safety of the community. This inquiry could serve as a useful substantive
approach to bridge some of the concerns between the domestic law
advocates and the international law advocates; though, I also argue that the
domestic criminal law version of the dangerousness inquiry is better suited
to these cases. This individual-specific approach also better comports with
our nation’s historic values than the current approach used by the D.C.
Court of Appeals.
To this end, Part I gives an abbreviated overview of the current debate
surrounding Guantanamo detainees, laying out the relevant interests and
principles that are at stake. Part II briefly outlines Boumediene and some
relevant D.C. Circuit opinions. Part III then considers how the
dangerousness inquiry in the terrorism context might play out, and why the
domestic version of that inquiry is suited to the present context.

2. E.g., David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2003).
3. E.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Replies to Congressional Authorization: International
Law, U.S. War Powers, and the Global War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2653 (2005); see also
Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Jinks,
September 11].
4. Andrew C. McCarthy & Alykhan Velshi, Outsourcing American Law: We Need a National
Security Court (Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy Research No. 156, 2006), available at http://www.aei.
org/files/2009/08/20/20090820-Chapter6.pdf; see also Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, Op.-Ed., The
Terrorists’ Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A19 (arguing for “a comprehensive system of
preventive detention that would supplement the criminal process [and] would have greater legitimacy
than our current patchwork system”); Jinks, September 11, supra note 3.
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I. THE OVERARCHING INTERESTS AND FRAMEWORKS
The many debates surrounding the legal intricacies of the War on
Terror are far too varied and nuanced for an in-depth survey in this Note.
However, there is a more limited set of interests and principles that tend to
propel the discussion in its many forms, and they are similarly present here.
The overarching balancing inquiry is between the government’s authority
to detain, without trial, individuals it considers dangerous for national
security purposes and an individual’s interest in maintaining his personal
liberty and autonomy (particularly if the individual is innocent of any
wrongdoing). There remains the question of what legal framework best
reconciles those interests in the terrorism context, acts of which have
historically been dealt with as crimes, but which after September 11 have
taken on a dimension more akin to acts of war.
The fact that the contested terrorism cases deal with preventive
detention adds another layer of complexity. If the government’s evidence
establishes that a detainee committed war crimes or committed terrorist
acts, it would be a familiar context both for the law of war and for general
criminal law. Those frameworks would use detainment in its most
commonly accepted role: punishment as condemnation of socially
undesirable actions.5 However, when the government’s knowledge is not
fully developed, when it cannot satisfy a standard of beyond a reasonable
doubt, detention morphs into something quite different. Instead of a tool for
punishment, detention primarily becomes a means for prevention of future
harm. It is based on the government’s belief that it has or will have enough
information about the detainee to warrant concern about some future act of
war or criminal undertaking, and the risk that that act might come to pass is
simply too great to justify freeing the individual.6 Therefore, the suspect is
simply detained for what might become an indefinite period of time.7 Both
the law of war and criminal law have developed frameworks of preventive
detention, though neither wholly fit the current paradigm, which factually
lives halfway between both worlds.

5. See Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization of the Criminal Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 121, 129
(2005).
6. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (1987) (“The government’s interest in
preventing crime by arrestees is both legitimate and compelling.”). But see generally Paul H. Robinson,
Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV.
1429 (2001) (discussing the dangers of a prevention-based criminal system).
7. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (noting the possibility of indefinite
detention in a non-traditional conflict).
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Deprivations of liberty by the government have long been accepted
under international law as a normal incident of war.8 However, this
allowance has not diminished the belief that such detention constitutes an
extraordinary act of government power.9 The exertion of this extraordinary
power, particularly in a democratic republic like the United States, usually
relies on justifications unique to the context of war. The foremost
justification is, of course, that the government has a duty to defend its
people, and when that duty is in play, government power broadens
significantly.10 This line of reasoning has assumed particular importance in
how U.S. courts have applied the laws of war. In one such case, Johnson v.
Eisentrager, the U.S. Supreme Court found that German operatives
captured abroad during World War II did not have access to habeas, the
Supreme Court emphasizing the fact that the prisoners had actively worked
against U.S. interests during the War.11 Similarly, in Ex parte Quirin,
addressing German saboteurs caught on U.S. soil, the Court again noted
that times of war and national emergency create a different social and legal
context than that of everyday life.12
However, there are limiting principles on this justification that
traditionally circumscribe the exercise of government’s heightened wartime
powers. Namely, the traditional view was that enemy soldiers wear
uniforms, making identification easy, that such soldiers have representative
states that can negotiate through diplomatic channels for their fair treatment
and eventual return, and that there is a definable and often definitive end-

8. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 (“[D]etention of individuals falling into the limited category [of
enemy combatants], for the duration of the particular conflict in which they were captured, is [a]
fundamental and accepted . . . incident to war . . . .”).
9. In its brief in Hamdi, the government made a concerted effort to present the issue of
detainment as one potentially circumscribed to the context of war. See Brief for the Respondents at 14,
Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696), 2004 WL 724020, at *14 (noting that “the President’s war powers
include the authority to capture and detain enemy combatants in wartime, at least for the duration of a
conflict”). But see Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 552 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgment) (noting the “inadequacy” of the government’s argument on this front).
10. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (holding that there
are “necessary concomitants of nationality” in the international context that authorize executive
authority). But see Salerno, 481 U.S. at 766 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Grave public danger is said to
result from what [the defendants] may be expected to do, in addition to what they have done since their
conviction. If I assume that defendants are disposed to commit every opportune disloyal act helpful to
Communist countries, it is still difficult to reconcile with traditional American law the jailing of persons
by the courts because of anticipated but as yet uncommitted crimes. Imprisonment to protect society
from predicted but unconsummated offenses is . . . unprecedented in this country and . . . fraught with
danger of excesses and injustice . . . .” (ellipses in original) (quoting Williamson v. United States, 184
F.2d 280, 282 (2d Cir. 1950)).
11. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
12. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1942).
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point to a state of active war marked by surrender.13 The presence of such
criteria has been a mainstay of discussion and debate surrounding military
authority in a time of war, serving as the countervailing interests against an
otherwise unchecked national security interest. In essence, those traditional
realities affirmed a measure of confidence that even if violations occur,
their impact will be minimal.
There are two problems with applying the law of war framework to
current U.S. operations. First, from a strictly formalist viewpoint, the U.S.
is not in a state of congressionally declared war. Though some scholars are
considerably troubled by this omission,14 particularly since the U.S. has not
been in a formal state of declared war since World War II,15 the lack of a
formal declaration is primarily a domestic constitutional issue, and does not
alone trigger a distinct outcome under the international legal framework.
Instead, that broader legal regime is more powerfully affected by the
absence of those ameliorative criteria discussed above. Members of
terrorist groups do not wear uniforms, do not have a nation-state to
advocate for them, and the end of the War on Terror may eventually prove
as ephemeral as that of the War on Drugs. As such, the potential for abuse
and violations is much higher in some regards than in a typical war.16 In
particular, the temporal ambiguity of the conflict creates the possibility of a
permanent ratchet of executive authority, something that goes against the
understanding that war powers are extraordinary, and ought to be
temporary.17
In the domestic criminal context, executive detention becomes a very
different matter from its wartime counterpart. Any attempt to detain an
individual must meet strict constitutional requirements, both procedural and
substantive. Domestically, detainment is almost exclusively the province of
the criminal process, with occasional forays by the civil system as well.18

13. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2124 (2005).
14. E.g., Bruce Ackerman, This Is Not a War, 113 YALE L.J. 1871 (2004).
15. See RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32170, INSTANCES OF USE OF
UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1798-2006, at 15-39 (2007) (reporting no formal
declarations of war by the United States after World War II).
16. Robert Chesney & Jack L. Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and
Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1100 (2008).
17. After all, the position of Caesar in ancient Rome was originally temporary, exemplified by
Lucius Cincinnatus, who was dictator of Rome for sixteen days (long enough to save it from invasion)
and then voluntarily gave up his power. 1 TITUS LIVIUS (LIVY), THE HISTORY OF ROME 170-73 (Ernest
Rhys ed., Canon Roberts trans., E.P. Dutton & Co. 1912) (c. 25 B.C.E.).
18. David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97
CAL. L. REV. 693, 697 (2009) (referencing the civil commitment of mentally disabled persons,
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The executive branch does not enjoy broad deference from the courts in
this setting; instead, its reach is strictly circumscribed and judicial review
of detention is high, both ex post (through the many doctrines governing
prosecutions)19 and ex ante (through the appellate process and habeas
corpus review).20 This is particularly true with preventive detention. The
contexts in which the executive is allowed to preventively detain an
individual are severely limited and are contingent on either a future or past
trial in the criminal context.21 Situations where the government may
preventively detain someone include holding a material witness for future
testimony,22 detaining an accused individual who is deemed either a flight
risk or danger to the community in the face of an upcoming trial,23 and
continuing to keep convicted sex offenders past their sentences upon a
showing that they are still dangerous to the community.24 In each of these
situations, the government must make some kind of showing to a judge and
receive a favorable ruling before the preventive detention is allowed.
But the majority of the detainees at Guantanamo have not been
prosecuted under the available federal or state criminal statutes.25 The
nature of the terrorist organization—internationally based, bent on
widespread destruction of entire societies—separates organizations like al
Qaeda from the individuals and groups previously prosecuted under
domestic statutes, and in response, both the current and previous
presidential administrations have sought far-reaching detainment power.26
Without the promise of a future trial, the criminal law’s framework for
preventive detainment offers only limited guidance as to how courts should
move forward. Additionally, there has been strong push-back by both
scholars and judges, in addition to government lawyers, against an
importation of domestic criminal law principles into the Guantanamo cases.
The objections center primarily on two propositions: first, that if any
immigration detentions for persons who are flight risks, and quarantines as examples of civil preventive
detention).
19. E.g., U.S. CONST., amend. IV; FED. R. CRIM. P.; FED. R. CIV. P.
20. JUDITH FARBEY, R.J. SHARPE, WITH SIMON ATRILL, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS, 1, 21-23
(3d ed. 2011).
21. Cole, supra note 18, at 700.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006).
23. FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 32.1(a)(6).
24. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369 (1997) (holding that post-conviction civil
commitment of sex offenders does not violate the double jeopardy clause).
25. The Guantanamo Docket, NEW YORK TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo (last
updated Feb. 15, 2012) (showing that of the 779 detainees who have been held at Guantanamo, 600
have been transferred to other countries). But see U.S. v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D.Va.
2003) (cert denied 125 S.Ct. 1670, Mar. 21, 2005).
26. See Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009).
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criminal law were imported, all of its procedures and doctrines would have
to be carried over as well; and second, that the need to follow the
accompanying evidentiary and procedural rules that mark domestic
criminal cases would overly encumber government action charged with
safeguarding national security. There is also an accompanying concern that
the necessary relaxing of the criminal doctrines for terrorism cases would
infect domestic cases as well, leading to an overall degeneration of
domestic protections.27
Though there are strong government interests in preventive detention
and sources of authority in both contexts—police power for criminal law
and war powers for law of war—the countervailing interest in each
situation is also particularly strong: personal liberty. In the United States,
individual liberty from government interference and control unchecked by
the restraints of due process remains an overriding concern of its
Constitution and its people.28 This is particularly true when the risks
associated with erroneous detention are high, both in terms of the difficulty
of correctly identifying an enemy who does not wear uniforms, and the
devastating costs to the detainee in terms of potentially years of freedom
lost. The question of whether a foreign national’s personal liberty interest
warrants rigorous review of the causes justifying his incarceration when
detained on U.S. soil was resolved in the affirmative by Boumediene,
discussed below. The ongoing question that the courts now face is where to
strike the balance between the historic interests of freedom and security
without a neatly applicable framework. I do not propose to resolve this
debate here, but merely to support a doctrine I think has been erroneously
excluded from the discussion.
II. SOME CASE HISTORY
Before discussing dangerousness, it is valuable to examine some of
the case history of habeas review for aliens detained abroad. Boumediene v.
Bush addressed the status of several foreign nationals “designated as enemy
combatants and detained” at Guantanamo Bay.29 The detainees had been
held without formal charges and argued that they possessed a right to
habeas corpus under the Constitution, a right not voided by their

27. See John Farmer, Op-Ed, A Terror Threat in the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 13, 2008, at A; see
also Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, Op-Ed, The Terrorists’ Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at
A19; Michael B. Mukasey, Op-Ed, Jose Padilla Makes Bad Law, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2007.
28. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (saying that substantive due process stands to
protect right “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” from government interference).
29. 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008).
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designation as enemy combatants.30 The Court agreed, holding that the
government must provide sufficient evidence to justify continued
detainment.31
In so deciding, the Court extended habeas review to individuals
detained by the U.S. government on de facto U.S. territory, including
Guantanamo.32 However, the Court did not describe what habeas review for
detainees entailed; it simply held that the review proceedings were
inadequate as compared to the proceedings seen in previous cases.33
Principally, the Court looked to Eisentrager, discussed earlier, noting that
the Guantanamo processes did not have a comparable “rigorous adversarial
process,” falling “well short of the procedures and adversarial mechanisms
that would eliminate the need for habeas corpus review.”34 However, the
Court did not describe what mechanisms would sufficiently meet the
requirements of habeas in the present context, leaving either the lower
courts or Congress the responsibility of deciding the ultimate manifestation
of judicial review for these cases.35
Congress has not acted to redefine habeas proceedings since
Boumediene, so the various courts of the D.C. circuit have labored to erect
some framework of analysis absent legislative guidance. Since 2008, the
district courts have issued thirty-eight opinions on the issue, and the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals has issued eleven decisions on appeal dealing
with the issue.36 These cases scrutinize government action under the
Authorization for Use of Military Force (hereinafter referred to as AUMF),
passed soon after the attacks of September 11. The relevant text of the
AUMF authorizes the president to “use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided” those attacks in order “to prevent any
future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such

30. Id. at 2277.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2262.
33. Id. at 2259-60.
34. Id. at 2260 (The German operatives “were charged by a bill of particulars that made detailed
factual allegations against them…were entitled to representation by counsel, allowed to introduce
evidence on their own behalf, and permitted to cross-examine the prosecution’s witnesses.”).
35. See Chisun Lee, Op-Ed., Their Own Private Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2009, at A31
(discussing the disparate standards reached by courts for the government’s detention authority and
urging Congress’ and the President’s involvement to ensure consistency).
36. Ben Wittes, Robert M. Chesney & Larkin Reynolds, The Emerging Law of Detention 2.0: The
Guantanamo Habeas Cases as Lawmaking, in THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 2 (2011), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2011/05_guantanamo_wittes/05_guantanamo_wittes
.pdf.
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nations, organizations or persons.”37 The AUMF does not contain a sunset
provision, leaving no temporal cutoff for presidential action under its
authority absent revocation by Congress. This raises questions about how
long a person may be permissibly detained in furtherance of the broader
goal of stamping out sources of terrorism, and what law should be applied
in fleshing out the application of the AUMF more than a decade after its
enactment, and after a series of Supreme Court decisions.38
This search for an applicable background framework was evident in Al
Bihani v. Obama. There the government alleged that Al Bihani was
affiliated with and militarily trained by al Qaeda, and supported the Taliban
in a skirmish with U.S. military forces in Afghanistan.39 Al Bihani
countered that he was merely a cook, and denied that he had ever received
military training or even pursued a relationship with al Qaeda.40 Judge
Leon found that Al Bihani’s ties with al Qaeda were sufficient to establish
membership within the organization and that serving as a cook was an act
of support, enabling the government to satisfy habeas review.41 On review,
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals panel had a different idea. Judges Brown
and Kavanaugh wrote explicitly that the international laws of war were
irrelevant to the question of appropriate detention under the AUMF.42
Instead, they reasoned that domestic law sources alone provided the
appropriate tools for the court, and applied the Military Commissions Act
of 2006 and its 2009 successor (collectively hereinafter referred to as
MCA).43 However, what might have been a settled issue became quickly
unsettled. Al Bihani petitioned for en banc review; though it denied review,
a majority of the en banc court stated that the panel’s rejection of
international law was dicta,44 and a later case explicitly relied on
international law.45 At the end of this very public discussion in the D.C.
Circuit, there still remains “the lingering disagreement regarding which
bodies of law actually govern” the issues surrounding detention.46

37. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
38. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2123-24 (2005); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
39. Al Bihani v. Obama, 594 F. Supp. 2d 35, 38 (D.D.C. 2009).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 39.
42. Al Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871-72 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Judge Williams joined in the
judgment but questioned this idea of the majority).
43. Id. at 872-73.
44. Al Bihani v Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (denial of petition for rehearing en banc).
45. See Al Warafi v. Obama, No. 10-5170, 2011 WL 678437 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 22, 2011).
46. Chesney & Reynolds, supra note 36, at 34.
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In another case decided the same year as Al Bihani, the court in Awad
v. Obama similarly followed the membership model for analyzing the
government’s justification for detention, finding evidence that the detainee
was “part of al Qaeda in December of 2001.”47 Though the government
provided a significant amount of evidence regarding Awad’s alleged
personal actions,48 the court repeatedly emphasized the membership
analysis used in Al Bihani.49 These decisions are consistent with earlier
terrorism cases in the circuit that held that the AUMF, consistent with
international law, authorized detention based on membership.50 What this
has also meant is that individuals found to be supporting al Qaeda, but not
actual members of the organization, do not fall within the scope of the
AUMF under international law.51
III. FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS
A. International and Domestic Frameworks
The legal framework apparently adopted by the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals is described as a “membership-based” method of analysis for
detention. As discussed above, this is the model favored by the
international legal framework. The simplest distinction between the
artificially binary approaches to detention employed by international law
and criminal law is that the former employs status-based determinations
and the latter employs conduct-based determinations. Justification for
detention under international law is primarily based on the group
membership, or status, of an individual.52 U.S. criminal law, however,
focuses on the individual’s conduct. Even when Judges Brown and
Kavanaugh looked to the MCA for guidance,53 they still employed a
primarily international law perspective, because the MCA also bases its
determinations on membership, most likely reflecting a desire to frame
government action taken under the MCA as war.
47. Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
48. Id. at 4-5.
49. See, e.g., id. at 1.
50. See Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 55 (D.D.C. 2009); Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F.
Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009).
51. Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 63.
52. Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1084-85.
53. As a side note, the MCA does not provide a framework for legal analysis, merely a possible
definition for individuals subject to detention. It simply states that military commissions may proceed
against aliens who are members of AUMF-covered groups and those who provide support to those
groups. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3, 120 Stat. 2600, 2601-02 (codified
as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a(1), 948c); Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §
18-2, 123 Stat. 2190, 2575-76 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a, 948b(a)).
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International law considers detention primarily as an exercise of state
power against a known enemy. The Geneva Conventions generally govern
the rights and privileges surrounding detention incident to international
war.54 The relevant international law in the Guantanamo cases is Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Convention—which regulates conflicts between a
state and non-state actor—and Additional Protocol II, which also applies to
non-international conflicts.55 The difficulty in applying these sources of law
is that neither Common Article 3 nor Additional Protocol II discusses the
detention of prisoners. While Common Article 2 “exhaustively regulates”
detentions and incorporates the entirety of the Geneva Convention,56
Common Article 2 applies to conflicts between two nation-states, a context
dissimilar to the War on Terror. This leaves the courts with the job of
attempting to analogize Common Article 2, a non-applicable agreement, to
Guantanamo detentions, or of supplementing in Common Article 3 and
Additional Protocol II with general principles of international law. The
D.C. Circuit courts do not seem opposed to these analytical processes, as
they have twice indicated that international law encompasses both conflicts
between two nation-states and asymmetric conflicts between one nationstate and a non-state actor.57
Looking to broad principles under the Geneva Convention,
“membership in a specific group is a necessary condition for POW status in
five out of six scenarios, and for the most part, it is a sufficient condition as
well. Associational status in that sense is the primary triggering condition
for military detention during international armed conflict.”58 Since most of
international law up to this point has dealt with the interactions of nationstates,59 the background understanding of the membership-framework
largely depends on the existence of uniforms, an outmoded requirement

54. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 641-42 (2006).
55. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts, adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts, adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional
Protocol II].
56. David Mortlock, Definite Detention: The Scope of the President’s Authority to Detain Enemy
Combatants, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 381 (2010).
57. Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 59 (D.D.C. 2011); Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp.
2d, 63, 73 (D.D.C. 2009).
58. Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1084-85.
59. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060
(1945) (describing the accepted sources of international law, all of which come from sovereign nations
in some way).
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imported into the terrorism context at the great expense of descriptive
accuracy.
Both the Bush and Obama administrations have clearly expressed their
belief that the appropriate source-material for detention inquiries lies in
international law doctrine. “The [Obama] Administration has stated that,
whether or not the various international agreements bind the United States,
‘[p]rinciples derived from law-of-war rules governing international armed
conflicts’ must inform any determination of detention under the AUMF.”60
This understanding is echoed by several district courts and scholars.61
However, the traditional law of war framework is inextricably linked with
an unwillingness to place a high burden of proof on the government’s
ability to detain suspected terrorists.
The military model is the least demanding, traditionally requiring a
showing of mere group membership in the enemy armed forces and
providing alleged detainees with relatively trivial procedural protections.
At the other extreme, the civilian criminal model is the most demanding,
tending to require a showing of specific criminal conduct and providing
defendants with a panoply of rights designed to reduce the risk of
erroneous convictions.62

Yet concern about over-burdening the government should not
foreclose an inquiry into whether criminal law might in fact prove a more
workable framework for habeas review. While international detention
analysis relies on notions of sovereignty and state actor reciprocity,
criminal law detention finds its primary justification in the government’s
exercise of police power.63 Moreover, the international law on these issues
can be very opaque, leading to uncertainty in the judicial process.64
Contrary to the international law’s membership model for detention,
“[i]n the American legal tradition, criminal sanctions typically attach to
one’s conduct and not one’s status or associations.”65 A future
60. Mortlock, supra note 55, at 380-81.
61. E.g., Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 70-71; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 2091;
Goodman & Jinks, supra note 3, at 2654-56.
62. Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1081.
63. See generally Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1
(2003).
64. See Al Warafi v. Obama, No. 10-5170, 2011 WL 678437 (D.C. Cir. Feb 22, 2011) (circuit
remanded for further fact finding relating to parts of the Geneva Convention about detention of medical
personnel).
65. Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1082. But see Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE)
Statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (2006); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2006).
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dangerousness review in criminal law looks to past conduct (alleged or
otherwise) rather than status to determine whether an individual poses a
future risk of harmful or obstructing conduct—uncontrollable violent or
sexual behavior, a flight risk, etc.66 In particular, the non-punitive models
of criminal detentions are the best analogue to military detention; military
detention is about preventing harm, not condemnation of individual actors,
while criminal detention most frequently is meant to punish.67
Dangerousness determinations frequently occur in the course of nonpunitive detention hearings.68 Preventive detentions that have been upheld
generally share three commonalities: a non-punitive nature, temporal
limitation, and an individual-specific justification.69 Non-punitive detention
generally arises in three relevant domestic contexts: pre-trial detention,
continued imprisonment for some mentally ill persons, and continued
imprisonment for certain sex offenders. The dangerousness inquiry
emphasizes the past conduct of an individual, and requires the government
to meet a certain evidentiary bar before it can proceed. Though this can be
a difficult task—predicting human behavior usually is—it is one the
Supreme Court has found to be commonplace in American jurisprudence.70
In many cases, the bar is that of clear and convincing proof, a lower
standard that that required in a normal trial resulting in punitive detention.71

66. However, the future dangerousness inquiry is not without controversy, see, e.g., Paul H.
Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention As Criminal Justice, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 1429, 1432 (2001); see also Meghan Shapiro, An Overdose of Dangerousness: How "Future
Dangerousness" Catches the Least Culpable Capital Defendants and Undermines the Rationale for the
Executions It Supports, 35 AM. J. CRIM. L. 145, 200 (2008) (discussing the moral and evidentiary
challenges to using future dangerousness in capital punishment cases).
67. Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1082.
68. For a more complete look at the Supreme Court doctrine of future dangerousness, see Kansas
v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (civil commitment of mentally ill sex offenders); United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (pretrial detention of dangerous adults); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253
(1984) (pretrial detention of dangerous juveniles); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (civil
commitment of mentally ill); Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695 (1949) (courts martial of American
soldiers). For a description of the contexts in which dangerousness determinations play a role in the
criminal process, see Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness as a Criterion in the Criminal Process, in
LAW, MENTAL HEALTH & MENTAL DISORDER 360-63 (Bruce Sales & Daniel Shuman eds., 1996).
69. See Cole, supra note 18, at 708.
70. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274-76 (1976) (“Prediction of future criminal conduct is an
essential element in many of the decisions rendered throughout our criminal justice system . . . [that
task] is thus basically no different from the task performed countless times each day throughout the
American system of criminal justice.”).
71. E.g., Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (upholding preventive detention pending trial under a “clear and
convincing” standard). However, the district courts of the District of Columbia and the D.C. Court of
Appeals have been using a preponderance of the evidence standard in all of their evidentiary rulings
against the government. Chesney & Reynolds, supra note 36, at 34, 12.
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These sources may aid in providing a standard for reviewing the
potential future dangerousness of detainees and weighing the executive’s
arguments for continued imprisonment. Moreover, this application would
not be wholly foreign to the area of terrorism, which has historically been
categorized as criminal acts as well as acts of war.72
B. The Potential Benefits of a Conduct-Based Dangerousness Inquiry
The future dangerousness inquiry as it manifests in the domestic
context may prove more beneficial as a basis for detention vis-á-vis the
status-based alternative, primarily because it requires a particularized
showing of potential harm, a requirement comporting well with—and even
emerging from—the values of accountability and procedural checks
otherwise embraced in the American system. Such a showing need not
necessitate that the government produce the full weight of its evidence––it
certainly does not in the preliminary hearing context in federal domestic
cases73––but such a requirement would constitute a burden higher than the
government’s mere assertions that unproven proximity or association
necessitate detention. It is almost like having a good faith requirement for
government action. Particularized evidence facilitates an individualspecific determination by the tribunal, placing courts in a better position to
discharge their vital role as a neutral check on an executive whose
overwhelming responsibility to ensure our national security may lead to
over-detention.
This restraint on the executive is particularly important in the
terrorism context. The individuals who are accused of terrorist activity do
not have a state that will defend their interests or work to provide
countervailing evidence on their behalf. Without that external backing,
countervailing checks furnished by U.S. judicial processes, including
access to counsel and judicial review, stands as the only systemic bulwark
against potentially improper executive detention.
It may be that the majority of the detainees are indeed guilty, and
perhaps still more would be justifiably detained pending a final judgment
as to either guilt or innocence. We should hope that our intelligence
agencies are that accurate. But “[c]onstitutional safeguards for the
protection of all who are charged with offenses are not to be disregarded in
order to inflict merited punishment on some who are guilty.”74 Nothing
72. John P. McLoughlin, Gregory P. Noone & Diana C. Noone, Security Detention, Terrorism,
and the Prevention Imperative, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 463, 467-69 (2009).
73. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751 (upholding preventive detention pending trial under a “clear and
convincing” standard).
74. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942).
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about our history or the structure of the Constitution justifies or requires
blind trust in the inherent but unproven accuracy of government assertions.
If habeas is to have any significance in the context of detainees in the
War on Terror, there must be a meaningful review of the government’s
detention power. For there to be such a meaningful review, courts must
actively engage with and scrutinize the evidence proffered by the
government. This requires evidence to question, and a membership-based
inquiry functionally cedes the court’s supervisory ability to the executive;
the evidence for membership offered in many of these cases has focused on
the fact that the accused was picked up in the same location as other
suspected terrorists.75 In this way, the courts have been made to determine
only whether the individual was sufficiently connected to an organization
the government has labeled dangerous, missing the step of determining the
individual’s actual dangerousness.
Circumstantial association may be informative, but it should not stand
in for an individual’s particular propensity to engage in violent behavior on
the level of deadly terrorist attacks. It would likely be the case that an
individual affiliated with a terrorist organization would be considered
dangerous, and a finding to that effect would certainly cut in favor of
detention. However, requiring a particularized explanation of what
individual detainees have done or said in the past, or even while detained,
should also have a place in the habeas process surrounding the liberty
interests of the detainees. This is particularly true with habeas review; as an
inherently reactionary doctrine that gives a responsive power to individuals
against government detainment, its purpose is to make the government give
an account of its actions.76
Requiring this type of particularized showing also does less violence
to our historic protection of individual autonomy. Though dangerousness
inquiries are somewhat ephemeral and purport to predict and preempt
future action, detention on that basis ought to at least arise from the actual
75. See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Attendance at either an alQaida training camp or an al-Qaida guesthouse ‘would seem to overwhelmingly, if not definitively,
justify’ detention.” (citing Al Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 873 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2010)); Al Bihani v.
Obama, 594 F. Supp. 2d 35, 39-40 (D.D.C. 2009) (al Bihani was apprehended in same location as other
terrorists); Al Alwi v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 24, 28 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[P] stayed at guesthouses closely
associated with the Taliban and al Qaeda . . . .”) (decision authorizing government detention affirmed
by Al Alwi v. Obama, 653 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011)); Gharani v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 144, 147-48
(D.D.C. 2009) (holding that the government failed to meet its burden of proof and granting el Gharani’s
habeas petition despite hearing the government’s argument for detention partially because el Gharani
“stayed at an al Qaeda-affiliated guesthouse . . . .” ).
76. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(stating that civil rights, of which habeas review is one, “gives a private right that authority shall go no
farther.”).
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words and actions of the individual to be detained, respecting his personal
autonomy (even if the result of that inquiry results in punitive or nonpunitive detention).77 This practice would also conform better to an
understanding of a government of constitutional restraints, limited
necessarily and deliberately by the People who give it force.78 In this way,
requiring the government to hew more closely to the traditional
expectations surrounding its exercise of detention power supports the rule
of law.79
Though it may seem difficult to place such a high priority on the
processes of law and government justification, particularly with regard to
those accused of seeking our ultimate demise, our society has looked back
with great disappointment at instances in which we have failed to give
adequate weight to our principled view of limited government, even in the
face of grave threats. As we saw in Korematsu and the McCarthy hearings,
our country does not live up to its potential when we sacrifice skepticism of
government power and adherence to constitutional limits for the latitude
government claims is necessary to ensure national security.80
I do not believe that the argument in favor of future dangerousness
inquiries in detainees’ habeas review context necessitate a wholesale
importation of domestic criminal law process. Just because the general
framework is used does not require that all of the procedural safeguards
and substantive rules need to be as stringent or present at all. Even in the
domestic context, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure suspend the
normal rules of evidence in some circumstances.81 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has emphasized that evidentiary rules regarding hearsay do not have
to apply for there to be adequate habeas review.82 The procedural benefit to

77. See Alec D. Walen, Crossing a Moral Line: Long-Term Preventive Detention in the War on
Terror, 28 PHIL. & PUB. POL’Y Q. 15 (2008).
78. For a broader discussion of the extraterritorial application of the Constitution see generally
Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitutional After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV.
259 (2009).
79. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Guantanamo and the Conflict of Laws: Rasul and Beyond, 153 U.
PA. L. REV. 2017, 2018 (2005).
80. Cole, supra note 2, at 3 (“In hindsight, these responses are virtually always considered
mistakes. They invite excesses and abuses, as many innocents suffer without any evident gain in
security. And most significantly, they compromise our most basic principles—commitments to equal
treatment, political freedoms, individualized justice, and the rule of law.”).
81. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1. The advisory committee notes make clear that the rule allows
preliminary hearings and grand jury investigations to rely on hearsay that would be inadmissible at trial
for its decision. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1 advisory committee’s note on 1972 adoption.
82. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533-34 (2004) (“[T]he exigencies of the circumstances
may demand that, aside from these core elements, enemy-combatant proceedings may be tailored to
alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict.
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using the dangerousness inquiry is that it is familiar and grounded. It can
serve as a stabilizing argumentative process in what is a very fluid area of
law at the moment, and can offer a way to make some of the unknowns of
dealing with terrorists less mysterious. Since the future dangerous inquiry
already entails some deference to the executive and a lowered burden of
proof, it can easily carry over into the terrorism context, paying due respect
to the national security interests at stake. Even if judges found that it
needed to be altered and tailored in some way, the future dangerousness
inquiry would still comprise a nearer fit than the traditional laws of war,
which do not fit the reality of our current international status.
CONCLUSION
Criminal analysis for future dangerousness is based on the known
conduct of the detainee, from before, during, and after the initial moment of
detention. This type of focus, if used in Guantanamo habeas proceedings,
could anchor the analysis of judges faced with these cases. It need not bring
in the other indicia of criminal analysis, such as a clear and convincing
burden of proof and evidentiary standards. Instead, it could serve as a
familiar and helpful guide in a quickly changing world faced with
circumstances yet unaddressed by international law.
Though some legal scholarship seems to support an international law
approach, that support is not as strong as it may seem. Numerous
arguments in favor of that framework frequently end up looking like a
conduct-based approach. For example, one discussion of using a laws of
war methodology argues that determinations of detainees’ dangerousness
“could be based on, among other things, the detainee’s past conduct, level
of authority within al Qaeda, statements and actions during confinement,
age and health, and psychological profile.”83 Those are all factors that
appear in the criminal dangerousness framework, and provide a glimpse
into how the model of domestic criminal law can better inform and guide
judicial review of detention in the War on Terror. Though that inquiry will
at times be difficult, filled with the usual ambiguities and judgment calls
that keep the law so interesting, “the fact that such a determination is
difficult . . . does not mean that it cannot be made.”84 For the courts to play
their constitutionally mandated role, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, a
more rigorous review process should be embraced, one that requires a
greater measure of proof on the part of the government in a manner more
Hearsay, for example, may need to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence from the
Government in such a proceeding.”).
83. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 2125.
84. Jurek v. Texas, 428 US. 262, 274-75 (1976) (Stevens, J.) (plurality opinion).
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closely aligned with our constitutional values. Incorporating a future
dangerousness inquiry into habeas review is one potentially useful method
for achieving that goal.

